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Despite the obvious phenomenological similarities between magical thinking and 
obsessive-compulsiveness, the relationship between them has been the subject of few 
empirical investigations in samples of children.  The present study aimed to examine the 
relationship between a general epistemic stance towards magical causation and 
tendencies towards obsessive-compulsiveness in a non-clinical sample of schoolchildren.   
One-hundred and two children, aged between 5 and 10 years (48 boys, 54 girls), 
completed questionnaire measures designed to assess magical thinking, 
obsessive-compulsiveness and other forms of anxiety.  School teachers completed a 
measure of strengths and difficulties for each child. General belief in magical causation 
was correlated with all types of anxiety, not just obsessive-compulsiveness, with 
significant correlations shown for boys in the sample, but not girls.  General belief in 
magical causation contributed little to the prediction of obsessive-compulsiveness beyond 
general anxiety. In this study, a general epistemic stance towards magical causation did 
not differentiate obsessive-compulsiveness from other anxiety dimensions. The findings 
are considered in the context of developmental theories of magical and scientific causal 
reasoning. 
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Magical thinking comprises the belief that ‘one’s thoughts, words, or actions can achieve 
specific physical effects in a manner not governed by the principles of ordinary 
transmission of energy or information’ (Zusne & Jones, 1989:13).  In everyday 
contexts, seemingly ‘magical’ acts are employed in the face of threat or uncertainty, such 
as the enactment of rituals aimed at preventing individual and community harm (Frazer, 
1959; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002), as well as common 
superstitious behaviours occasioned by anxiety, for example in competitive sport (Bleak 
& Frederick, 1998; Burger & Lynn, 2005) and when taking academic examinations 
(Gallagher & Lewis, 2001). As Subbotsky (2004a) notes, adults have recourse to magical 
thinking to give an illusion of control in uncontrollable circumstances, thus giving a sense 
of hope.  This suggests magical thinking coexists alongside more rational or scientific 
ways of reasoning and, as such, indicates a continuity of magical thinking from childhood 
to adulthood.  Early in life, as Bolton (1996) observes, the enactment of rituals may 
provide children with a sense of control in the face of anxiety, fear or uncertainty.  In 
support of this, it has been found that ritualistic behaviours are associated with stranger 
anxiety in children below the age of 4 years, and with a broader range of anxieties 
(contamination, death, violent crime) in older children (Evans, Gray & Leckman, 1999). 
Furthermore, in early childhood, ritualistic behaviours are directly related to magical 
beliefs and explanations of phenomena, and inversely related to naturalistic or physical 
explanations of the same phenomena (Evans, Milanak, Madeiros & Ross, 2002).  
Additionally, Piaget (1930) argued that the ‘egocentric’ preoperational child, typically 
below the age of 7 years, felt both guilt and fear when harbouring negative thoughts 
about others for fear that they might come true and the child would be responsible.   
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The coexistence of scientific and magical ways of thinking would suggest that 
adults revert to magical ways of thinking to manage threat and uncertainty, processes that 
are part of ‘normal’ development and are not given up due to the inevitability of 
uncontrollable threat and uncertainty and the need to retain control, albeit illusory.  
Indeed, Piaget’s observations concerning children’s fears about the potential of negative 
thoughts to come true have parallels with the concept of ‘thought-action fusion’, a 
cognitive bias evident in adults with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  The 
potential association between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness has long 
been a concern for theorists and researchers, and has led some authors (e.g. Bolton et al., 
2002) to observe that “the form of high anxiety and coping apparently most connected 
with magical thinking is obsessive-compulsion” (p482).  Cognitive theorists have 
postulated that obsessive-compulsive cognition concerns a tendency to equate thoughts of 
having undertaken a harmful act with the actual act itself. One way in which this 
‘thought-action fusion’ (TAF) manifests is in exaggerated probability estimates that bad 
thoughts can produce bad outcomes for self and/or others (‘likelihood TAF’; Shafran, 
Thordarson & Rachman, 1996).  Theoretically, such thinking produces anxiety and 
attempts to nullify threat portended by an obsession and subsequent appraisal of it; that 
is, neutralising activity in the form of compulsions is provoked.  While the topology of 
the relationship between obsession (e.g. fear of contamination) and neutralising (e.g. 
compulsive hand-washing) may have a logical link, frequently, the relationship appears 
arbitrary and without clear cause-effect relations. The tendency to engage in such 
arbitrary behaviours appears prima facie to be a manifestation of magical thinking: the 
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person acts as if s/he believes that outcomes can be influenced by behaviours that, 
ontologically, have little or no causal bearing on the event in question.  In the case of 
OCD it seems, therefore, that two points of what looks like magical thinking using Zusne 
and Jones’ definition may be observed: one occurs at the onset of the thought (the belief 
that thinking of harm increases the likelihood of its occurrence), and the other occurs to 
manage the anxiety the aforementioned thought process provokes (if I count to ten, harm 
can be prevented).  As Berle and Starcevic (2005) point out, likelihood TAF is similar to 
Piaget’s notion of ‘participation’.  Given these observations, it might be predicted that 
likelihood TAF is positively associated with distress from obsessions and with 
neutralizing.  Additionally, it might also be hypothesized that individuals with OCD 
hold more magical beliefs and more TAF beliefs than those without OCD.  
Experimental and correlational research offers some support for the hypothesized 
associations between likelihood TAF and obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
Importantly, the developing evidence base does not support the specificity of TAF to 
OCD.   
The reader is referred to Berle and Starcevic (2005) for a review of the TAF 
literature but some critical points are covered here in situating the current study.  Some 
authors (e.g. Einstein and Menzies, 2004a, 2004b) suggest that likelihood TAF, along 
with superstitiousness, might be manifestations of a broader construct of magical 
ideation, basing this on the observation, in undergraduate and OCD patient samples, that 
whilst magical ideation was positively correlated with measures of 
obsessive-compulsiveness after controlling for TAF, when magical ideation was held 
constant, correlations between TAF and obsessive-compulsiveness were no longer 
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significant.  Einstein and Menzies conclude that obsessive-compulsiveness is associated 
with a general tendency toward magical thinking.  Einstein and Menzies used the 
Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) which assesses a range of magical 
beliefs such as thought transmission, psychic phenomena and lucky charms and has been 
validated as a measure of schizotypy.  In a further study, Einstein and Menzies (2006) 
found that OCD patients scored significantly higher in magical ideation than patients with 
Panic Disorder and non-anxious controls.  The latter two groups did not differ 
significantly in magical ideation.  This would suggest some specificity of magical 
ideation to OCD.  Conversely, other research with adults and children questions the 
specificity of both TAF and magical ideation to obsessive-compulsiveness.  For 
example, Barrett and Healey (2003) found that children with OCD had significantly 
higher TAF ratings than non-clinical children, but did not differ from children with other 
anxiety disorders.  Similarly, studies involving adult OCD patients and those with other 
anxiety disorders question the specificity of TAF to OCD (e.g. Rassin, Diepstraten, 
Merckelback and Muris, 2001).  Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam and Kalsy (2003) 
found that OCD patients differed significantly from patients with Social Phobia, but did 
not differ from patients with Generalised Anxiety Disorder, or those with Panic Disorder, 
on likelihood-TAF measures. Additionally, differences in TAF between OCD and other 
anxious patients seemed attributable to higher negative affect in the OCD group.  Taken 
together, these studies suggest that TAF may be a cognitive bias evident across different 
anxiety disorders.  Turning to magical ideation, in an experimental study using a 
TAF-induction paradigm, Bocci and Gordon (2007) found that, relative to 
non-neutralizers, spontaneous neutralizers scored significantly higher on a measure of 
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magical ideation.  Neutralizers and non-neutralizers did not differ, however, in 
obsessive-compulsiveness or trait anxiety suggesting the process may not be specific to 
obsessional problems. Hence, as with TAF, there seems to be mixed evidence concerning 
the specificity of magical ideation to obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Currently, little empirical work has focused on the relationship between magical 
thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness and other types of anxiety in children.  Given 
that the average OCD onset age is between 7.5 and 12.5 years (Geller, Biederman, Jones, 
Park, Schwartz, Shapiro & Coffey, 1998) studies of these variables in childhood assume 
particular importance. Importantly, the emerging evidence base suggests that magical 
thinking might be relevant to a broad range of anxiety problems and, indeed, this would 
be a logical assertion given that magical thinking is proposed to be a strategy employed 
in the face of threat and uncertainty more broadly.  In the first developmental study of 
magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness, Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque and 
Baron-Cohen (2002) devised a Magical Thinking Questionnaire to assess 5- to-17 
-year-olds’ beliefs in being able to make events happen through a thought or an action 
that was causally unrelated. For the sample as a whole, there were moderate correlations 
between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness.  Of considerable note, these 
authors also found that magical thinking was related to other types of anxiety, not just to 
obsessive-compulsiveness.  Interestingly, and unexpectedly, this association was found 
for boys in the sample, but not girls.  What is not clear from this study, however, is the 
extent to which the correlation between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness 
is mediated by general anxiety.   
The aim of the present study was to replicate and extend the work of Bolton et al. 
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(2002) by providing further data on the association between magical thinking, 
obsessive-compulsiveness and anxiety in children, and by assessing the relationship 
between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness whilst controlling for anxiety.  
The present study tested the claim that, in a sample of children, magical thinking is not a 
specific feature of obsessive-compulsive type thinking, but instead, that it is a factor 
contributing to various forms of anxiety.  However, we were also interested in whether 
the gender differences in correlations between anxiety and magical thinking obtained by 
Bolton et al. (2002) would be observed, albeit in a sample with a narrower age range.  
Additionally, the study set out to examine whether magical thinking contributes unique 
variance to the prediction of obsessive-compulsiveness beyond that predicted by anxiety. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Children (n = 102) from three infant/primary schools in South-East England took part.  
Although 116 children initially opted in, 14 were not included, either due to absence on 
data collection days (n=11), psychiatric diagnosis (Asperger’s Syndrome, n=2) or special 
educational needs (n=1).  These latter three children were seen so that they did not feel 
excluded, but their data were not included in the analysis.  One school served a diverse 
community with the largest groups of pupils from the United Kingdom, Africa and the 
Carribbean.  The majority of children in the other two schools were from white British 
heritage.  One of the three schools had a higher than national average number of 
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children eligible for free school meals.  The schools did not differ in proportion of 
children with special educational needs. 
Of the 102 children included, there were 48 boys (47%) and 54 girls ranging in 
age from 5 to 10 years (mean age 7.7 years, SD 1.7 years).  The sample was divided into 
three school-year age groups: 5-6 year olds (N=33), 7-8 year olds (N=27), and 9-10 year 
olds (N=34).  A questionnaire was given out to the classroom teacher of every child that 
participated and 100 (98%) were returned.   No incentives were used to gain 
participation but each child received a small gift after taking part.  Children and their 
parents/carers were aware of the general nature of the research but not of the specific 
hypotheses. 
 
Measures 
Short Leyton Obsessional Inventory – Child Version (SLOI-CV; Bamber, Tamplin, Park, 
Kyte & Goodyer, 2002) 
This is an 11-item self-report measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in children, 
present over the past two weeks.  Scoring is a 4-point measure of symptom frequency 
(always = 3, mostly = 2, sometimes = 1, and never = 0) yielding a possible score range of 
0 to 33.  Factor analysis (n=253) reported by the scale authors indicated three subscales 
with satisfactory internal consistency: Compulsions (α = .73), Obsessions/incompleteness 
(α = .79), and Cleanliness (α = .75).  The internal consistency of the full scale was high 
(α = .86).  The full scale score was utilised in the current study.  The SLOI-CV was 
originally validated with a sample of adolescents.  Consequently, internal consistency 
analysis was conducted on SLOI-CV scores in the current study, with the sample divided 
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into the school-year age groups.  Results were as follows: 5-6 year age group, α = .76 
(n=33); 7-8 year age group, α = .65 (n=27); and, 9-10 year age group, α = .79 (n=34).  
The SLOI-CV, therefore, demonstrated adequate internal consistency in the current 
sample of children. 
 
Magical Thinking Questionnaire (MTQ; Bolton et al., 2002) 
This 30-item measure comprises two subscales, ‘Thought’ and ‘Action’, each consisting 
of 10 questions.  Thought subscale questions ask whether it is possible to make some 
event happen just by thinking about it (e.g. ‘Is it possible to move an object across a 
room just by thinking about it?’) and is similar to the construct of TAF-likelihood.  
Action subscale questions ask whether it is possible by some action to make some event 
happen, the specified action being causally unrelated to the specified event (e.g. ‘Is it 
possible to do really well at a test at school just by crossing your fingers?’).  These two 
subscale scores sum to the MTQ total score.  The remaining 10 questions, focussing on 
physical causal principles (e.g. ‘Is it possible for snow to melt?’), assess bias for 
responding ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  Any respondent attaining a bias score of more than two should 
be excluded (D. Bolton, personal communication, 10 May 2005).  The authors of the 
measure report a test-retest correlation for the MTQ total score of .90 (n=17) in a sample 
of children and adolescents aged 5 to 17 years. 
 
Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1997) 
This scale includes 38-items assessing six of the DSM-IV categories of anxiety disorder: 
separation anxiety, panic-agoraphobia, generalised anxiety, social phobia, fears of 
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physical injury, and obsessive-compulsiveness.  The subscales can be summed to give a 
total anxiety score.  The chid is asked to rate, on a four point scale (never, sometimes, 
often or always), how often each item happens to them. The responses are scored 0-4 
respectively, yielding a maximum possible score of 114.  Six items assess 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  The factor structure, reliability and validity of the 
scale have been supported in several previous studies of children and adolescents. 
 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire - Teacher Completed Version (SDQ; Goodman, 
1997) 
This is a brief behavioural screening questionnaire comprised of 25 attributes assessing 
conduct problems, hyperactivity, emotional symptoms, peer problems, and prosocial 
behaviour.  Respondents use a 3-point Likert scale to indicate how far each attribute 
applies to the target child.  All attributes except those related to prosocial behaviour are 
summed to generate a total difficulties score.  The one-sided informant-rated version for 
teachers and parents of 4-16 year olds was used.  Previous studies have supported the 
psychometric properties of the instrument (e.g. Goodman, 2001).  In the current study, 
this measure was utilised to assess whether magical thinking was related to non-anxiety 
related problems in children. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Written consent from parents/carers was required before a child could participate.  The 
consent procedure gave parents/carers the option of requesting to be informed if their 
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child appeared particularly worried or anxious during the study.  The study took place in 
the school that participants attended.  The author administering the questionnaires (CR) 
remained sensitive to children’s reactions during the procedure, and the potential for 
them getting upset.  If it was felt the child presented as a clinical concern, the child’s 
parent/carer would be invited for a face-to-face meeting with the researcher, but only if 
they had expressed a wish to be informed on the consent form.  No child presented as a 
clinical concern. 
Procedure 
A pilot study was conducted with five children in the target age range.  Four children 
could not understand the MTQ item ‘Is it possible to lose a race just because you lost 
your lucky mascot or lucky charm?’  Consequently, this item was excluded from the 
main study.  In the study proper, a standard introduction was read to children prior to 
administration of the questionnaires, which were given in the following order: (1) MTQ, 
(2) SCAS, and (3) SLOI–CV.  Following procedures reported by Bolton et al. (2002), 
younger children (5 and 6 year olds) were seen individually and the researcher read out 
the questionnaire items and hand-recorded children’s responses.  Older children (7 to 11 
years olds) were seen in groups (of 3 or 4 in the current study) with the researcher 
reading out the questions and each child recording their own answers.  Administration 
time ranged from 30 to 50 minutes, depending on the child’s age and ability.  All 
children were given a short break between the second and third questionnaire.  
Additional breaks were given when necessary dependent on how the researcher gauged 
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the child’s attention.  Upon completion of the task, each child was given time to ask 
questions and was given a gel pen. 
 
Results 
All data except for the SDQ scales appeared approximately normal from graphical output 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses.  With the exception of the SDQ scales, the data 
were sufficiently normally distributed to be analysed using parametric statistical tests.  
Two-tailed tests were used throughout. 
 
Relationship between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness 
As would be expected, the Pearson’s correlation between the SLOI-CV and the SCAS 
obsessive-compulsive subscale indicated a significant positive correlation of a large 
effect size (r = 0.61, n = 102, p<0.001).  Eight children scored more than two on the 
MTQ bias subscale and were subsequently excluded from further analyses involving the 
MTQ.  Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated between MTQ scores and 
scores on both the Short Leyton Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (SLOI-CV) and the 
Spence Obsessive-Compulsive subscale (SCAS-OC) for the whole sample and for boys 
and girls separately.  The results are shown in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The prediction that magical thinking would be positively correlated with 
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obsessive-compulsiveness was confirmed.  Larger effect sizes were evident for the 
SLOI-CV.  Analysis of the data divided by gender, however, indicates non-significant 
correlations between the SCAS-OC and MTQ scales for girls.  The correlation between 
the MTQ-Thought scale and the SLOI-CV fails to reach significance in the sample of 
girls. Comparison of the coefficients using Fisher’s transformation (Clark-Carter, 1997) 
indicated the correlations for boys were significantly greater (p<.05) than the girls for the 
MTQ Total and Thought subscale for both obsessive-compulsive measures.  
Correlations for the MTQ Action subscale did not differ significantly. 
 
Relationship between magical thinking and other forms of anxiety 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the relationships between 
the MTQ total and subscales and the SCAS subscales assessing panic/agoraphobia, 
separation anxiety, social phobia, generalised anxiety, and physical injury fears.  The 
results are shown in Table 2, for the whole sample and for boys and girls separately. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The prediction that there would be a positive relationship between magical 
thinking and other forms of anxiety was confirmed.  When the data are assessed 
separately for boys and girls, however, the results indicate relationships of a moderate to 
large effect size for the boys on most subscales, except physical injury fears.  
Conversely, the correlations for girls are all small and statistically non-significant.  
Taken together with the findings shown previously in Table 1, consistent significant 
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relationships between magical thinking and measures of obsessive-compulsiveness and 
other forms of anxiety were evident in the sample of boys, but not in the sample of girls. 
Coefficients for boys and girls were again compared using Fisher’s 
transformation.  For MTQ Total, correlations for boys were significantly different 
(p<.05) from girls for Total Anxiety, Panic and Social Phobia.  For MTQ Thought, 
correlations for boys were significantly different from girls for Total Anxiety (p<.05) and 
Social Phobia (p<.01).  For MTQ Action, none of the correlations were significantly 
different (p>.05) between boys and girls. 
 
Does magical thinking contribute unique variance to obsessive-compulsiveness? 
Previous analyses indicated significant correlations between MTQ scales and the 
SLOI-CV and the SCAS-OC for boys.  Furthermore, there were significant correlations 
between MTQ scales and other SCAS scales in the sample of boys.  Conversely, 
relationships between MTQ scales and the SCAS-OC and other SCAS scales were 
generally small and non-significant for girls.  Consequently, in assessing the contribution 
of magical thinking in predicting obsessive-compulsiveness, the analyses were conducted 
with data provided by boys only. 
 
Regression analyses – male sample (N = 44) 
Hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with SLOI-CV scores as the criterion 
variable, with the SCAS Total Anxiety (minus the OC subscale) as the predictor entered 
on the first block and MTQ Total as the predictor entered on the second block.  The 
model statistics are show in Table 3. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Combined, SCAS Total Anxiety (excluding the OC subscale) and MTQ Total 
accounted for 59 per cent of the variability in SLOI-CV scores in boys; however, the 
MTQ failed to add significantly to the model as an individual predictor.  A similar 
picture was evident when using the MTQ Thought and the MTQ Action scores in place 
of MTQ Total scores.  Hierarchical regression analysis was then conducted with 
SCAS-OC scores as the criterion variable.  The model statistics are show in Table 4. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
A pattern similar to the SLOI-CV was found.  Combined, the variables accounted 
for 54% of the variability in SCAS-OC scores but the MTQ failed to add significantly to 
the model as an individual predictor.  A similar picture was evident when using the 
MTQ Thought and the MTQ Action scores in place of MTQ Total scores.  MTQ scores 
did not contribute unique variance to the prediction of obsessive-compulsiveness beyond 
general anxiety. 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
It is possible that gender differences in correlations reflect the operation of other group 
differences between boys and girls.  Consequently, independent t-tests were used to 
compare boys and girls in magical thinking, anxiety dimensions and age.  Boys and girls 
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did not differ significantly in MTQ Total, Thought or Action scores, or in any of the 
Spence Anxiety sub-scales, including the Obsessive-Compulsive subscale, or Total 
Anxiety.  They did differ significantly in SLOI-CV scores: t(92) = 2.73, p=.007.  The 
mean score for girls was 12.08 (SD=5.94) and for boys it was 8.81 (5.55).  Additionally, 
they also differed significantly in age: t(92) = 2.56, p=.012.  The mean age for girls was 
8 years (SD=1.67) and for boys it was 7.15 years (SD=1.47).  In light of the significant 
difference in age between boys and girls, correlations between the MTQ scales, SLOI-CV 
and SCAS scales were re-analysed by age-band. The results are shown in Table 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Correlations between the MTQ and the SLOI-CV suggest a pattern of age-related 
differences.  However, correlations between the MTQ and the Spence 
Obsessive-Compulsive and other subscales, and Total Anxiety, do not reveal a clear 
pattern of age-related differences.  The three age-groups did not differ significantly in 
MTQ Total scores: F(2,91) <1, n.s.  For 5-6 year olds, the mean was 9.87 (SD 6.65), for 
7-8 year olds it was 8.11 (SD 5.43), and for 9-10 year olds it was 7.97 (SD 6.34). 
Finally, in order to examine whether magical thinking was related to other kinds 
of difficulties in children, scores on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
were correlated with the MTQ.  Spearman’s rho was used as the SDQ data departed 
significantly from normality.  The analysis revealed very small and non-significant 
relationships between the SDQ scales and the MTQ with coefficients ranging from .003 
to .129 for the MTQ Total, from .006 to .107 for the MTQ Thought subscale, and from 
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.083 to .129 for the MTQ Action subscale.  It might have been expected that the SDQ 
emotional scale would have been related to magical thinking since it is similar to anxiety.  
However, the emotional scale did not correlate significantly with anxiety as measured by 
the SCAS full scale (rho = 0.156, n = 100, p>0.05). 
 
Discussion 
The findings of the present study indicated that magical thinking was moderately 
correlated with the two measures of obsessive-compulsiveness in children, and thereby 
broadly replicated the findings of Bolton et al. (2002).  However, contrary to these 
investigators, significant correlations were found mainly for boys.  Furthermore, 
correlation coefficients were significantly greater for boys than girls for the MTQ Total 
and Thought scales.  Magical thinking was modestly to moderately correlated with each 
of the Spence Children’s Anxiety subscales with significant correlations for boys, not 
girls, which replicated the findings of Bolton et al. (2002).   Analyses further indicated 
that correlations between Total Anxiety and magical thinking were of comparable 
magnitude to the correlations between the two obsession-compulsion measures and 
magical thinking.  Importantly, further analyses indicated magical thinking was not 
associated with other indices of emotional and behavioural difficulties as indexed by the 
Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire.  Subsequent analyses in the sample of boys 
made use of an index of Total Anxiety (total SCAS excluding the Obsessive-Compulsive 
Subscale) to assess whether magical thinking added unique variance to the prediction of 
obsessive-compulsiveness beyond what was attributable to anxiety.  This analysis 
revealed that a large and significant proportion of the variance in both measures of 
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obsessive-compulsiveness could be attributed to Total Anxiety, with magical thinking 
accounting for very little additional variance.  
The association between magical thinking and anxiety is consistent with findings 
that experimental manipulations that increase risk of loss of a prized possession also give 
rise to ‘belief’ in a magical outcome in adults and children (Subbotsky, 1997, 2001, 
2004b). Magical thinking (at least as indexed by the MTQ) does not in turn appear to 
contribute to obsessive-compulsiveness. This may seem a surprising conclusion, given 
the affinity between the manifestations of obsessive-compulsiveness and magical 
thinking. This pattern of results suggests that magical thinking does not differentiate 
obsessive-compulsiveness from other anxiety dimensions.  The findings are consistent 
with previous studies on magical ideation (e.g. Bocci & Gordon, 2007) and likelihood 
TAF (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2003; Barrett and Healy, 2003; and, Rassin et al., 2001) 
with these studies suggesting that magical ideation/TAF is not specific to 
obsessive-compulsiveness.   
What is not clear at present is why the relationship between magical thinking and 
all types of anxiety should be present in boys, but not girls.  In the present study there 
were group differences that may have contributed to gender differences in correlations. 
Girls scored significantly higher than boys on the SLOI-CV, although not on the 
SCAS-OC.  It is possible that the reported gender differences in the relationship 
between magical thinking and obsessive-compulsiveness reflect a threshold effect; 
however, there were no gender differences in scores on the MTQ, which renders this 
possibility unlikely. Girls were also significantly older than boys, being approximately 10 
months older on average. When correlations between magical thinking and 
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obsessive-compulsiveness/other anxiety dimensions were calculated in the different age 
groups, the findings indicated that the relationship between obsession-compulsion and 
magical thinking was considerably stronger in the youngest group and may also explain, 
at least in part, why correlations for boys were higher than for girls. However, 
correlations between the MTQ and the Spence Obsessive-Compulsive and other 
subscales did not reveal such a clear pattern of age-related differences. These findings 
suggest that gender differences in the strength of correlations may not be explained by 
age differences between girls and boys in the present sample. Future studies should seek 
to disambiguate the influence of gender on correlations by matching girls and boys more 
closely on age and on the key variables indexed by the MTQ, SLOI-CV and the Spence 
Scales.  At the same time, future studies might assess variables that could explain any 
observed gender differences in correlations.  That is if, as evidenced in this study, boys 
and girls do not differ in magical thinking but that magical thinking is differentially 
related to anxiety in boys and girls (the latter finding also being observed by Bolton et al., 
2002), this might suggest something about gender differences in anxiety management or 
in the phenomenology of anxiety.  This raises the question of the function of magical 
thinking in boys and girls.  A review of gender differences in locus of control by 
Sherman, Higgs and Williams (1997) suggests that this might be a fruitful variable to 
focus on in future research.  These authors draw attention to findings that suggest 
gender differences in the perception of control over the uncontrollable, with males 
perceiving themselves as more capable than females.  Additionally, these authors also 
indicate that the stress-distress relationship is mediated by internality for males, but not 
for females.  Taken together, these findings might suggest that males may be more 
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likely to have recourse to magical thinking to manage genuinely uncontrollable stressful 
events.  As such, it could be the case that gender differences in correlations between 
magical thinking and anxiety might be attributable to gender differences in locus of 
control but future studies are needed to assess this possibility. 
Both the present study, and the study by Bolton et al. (2002), found that children 
between 5 and 10 years of age produced quite high scores indicative of belief in magical 
causation. Moreover, neither study found an age-related decline in magical thinking 
scores.  These findings are of considerable significance to conflicting models of the 
developmental relationship between magical thinking and scientific reasoning in children. 
Contrary to Piaget’s “developmental replacement” model (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; 
Piaget, 1930), recent authors have attempted to make a conceptual and empirical case for 
the view that scientific reasoning does not inexorably replace magical causal attributions 
in development. Indeed, adherents of the “developmental coexistence” model maintain 
that the acts of imagination used in representing and reasoning about anomalous events 
show developmental continuity from early childhood to adolescence and even beyond 
(e.g. Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotksy, 1992, 2004b). To date, experimental studies of 
the “developmental coexistence” hypothesis have produced ambiguous findings, perhaps 
due to using experimental events (e.g. Subbotsky, 1997) that might have a multitude of 
alternative explanations, and may not be an optimal context for assessing fundamental 
beliefs about magical causation.   In contrast, the MTQ samples a broad range of 
anomalous phenomena and asks respondents to indicate whether or not they believe in 
the possibility of magical causation. The findings thus far generated with this instrument 
seem to be more closely in keeping with the developmental coexistence model.  In this 
  
 
 
 
 
 
21 
respect, Subbotsky (2001) argues cogently for the combination of behavioural and verbal 
indices in research.  Subbotsky’s work indicates that, in verbal expressions, a 
replacement model of causal thinking might be evident yet behavioural indices tend to 
support the coexistence model; children and adults might say they do not endorse magical 
beliefs but their behaviour might indicate otherwise.  As such, both adults and children 
entertain the possibility of magical effects or, at the least, are not prepared to risk 
dispensing with such possibilities in situations involving threat.  This leads on to a key 
conceptual issue: how is it possible to identify an instance of magical thinking?  A 
behavioural measure (e.g. blowing on dice) may merely reflect dominant cultural 
practices, and perhaps more anxious individuals are more likely to resort to these. What is 
the actual belief underpinning this ritual?  Such an act is akin to superstition and tells us 
nothing about the underlying epistemic state.   
Any assessment of the findings would be incomplete without a discussion of 
methodological limitations of the study. The SLOI-CV has not been formally validated 
with children as young as 5 and 6 years.  Although the internal consistency of the scale 
in the current study was adequate, future work is needed to validate the use of the scale in 
younger children.  Additionally, a criticism that has been levelled at other non-clinical 
analogue research on obsessive-compulsiveness is that non-clinical phenomenology may 
not equate to clinical phenomenology.  Therefore, future studies are needed that 
compare clinical and non-clinical groups on symptom measures and on correlations 
between them and anxiety and magical thinking.  Notwithstanding this, the observation 
that magical thinking is associated with all types of anxiety, not just 
obsessive-compulsiveness, in a non-clinical sample is noteworthy if one considers a 
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continuum notion of anxiety states.  Validity and further reliability evidence is needed 
for the MTQ in samples of children and adolescents of different ages.  Bolton et al. 
(2002) designed the MTQ to reflect mental and physical causation that is implied in 
definitions of magical thinking, for example that by Zusne and Jones (1989).  The 
thinking subscale corresponds to TAF-likelihood.  However, as Bolton et al. point out, 
scores in younger children might reflect immature causal reasoning and so could be 
tapping something different to that in older children.  Additionally, the MTQ asks 
respondents to rate whether various effects are possible, rather than whether they 
themselves could be involved in producing such effects.  As such, the current form 
might tap the domain of imagination rather than belief.  As Berle and Starcevic (2005) 
point out, the literature contains varying conceptualisations of magical thinking.  It is 
likely that, in using this concept, it is unclear whether the realm of thought, imagination 
or belief is being tapped.  Previous research suggests that scores on the Magical Ideation 
Scale (MIS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) might differentiate OCD patients from other 
anxious patients (e.g. Einstein & Menzies, 2006).  Items in the MIS are largely 
self-referent and it is this aspect that might lead to differentiation between OCD and other 
anxious groups, or that might differentially relate to obsessive-compulsiveness and to 
other anxiety problems in non-clinical samples.  As the MIS is not validated for use in 
children, one possibility is that future studies might make use of a modified version of the 
MTQ that comprises self-referent items alongside the original version. 
The current study raises some interesting speculations about the role of magical 
thinking in anxiety.  Evidence appears to be accumulating that magical thinking, and its 
other manifestations such as TAF, may be an important feature across anxiety disorders.  
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A general epistemic stance towards magical causation might be important in all disorders 
of anxiety, as it might be in varying expressions of non-pathological uncertainty, with the 
shape of that disorder (e.g. obsessionality, social anxiety) being determined by the 
content of the specific fears.  In the case of obsessive-compulsiveness, O’Connor (2007) 
puts forward the idea that the obsessional reverts to ‘primitive’ states (i.e. compulsions) 
in order to manage his/her inability to tolerate negative affect, drawing attention to the 
focus in OCD of the person’s ability to damage others.  Ferrier and Brewin (2005) have 
found that OCD and anxious and non-anxious controls differ in their endorsement of 
‘dangerous self’ traits with the OCD group endorsing these significantly more often than 
the other two groups.  These authors speculate that a view of the self as dangerous may 
arise from early familial reactions to the expression of aggression.  Notwithstanding the 
need for empirical verification of these speculations, interventions that focus on 
challenging the belief that one is dangerous, coupled with the development of alternative 
strategies for the management of emotion, might ameliorate recourse to the magical 
stance in OCD. 
A significant limitation is that the current evidence is correlational and, as such, it 
is not possible to ascertain whether anxiety produces magical thinking, or vice versa, or 
whether the relationship between magical thinking and anxiety is the result of a third 
variable.  Given this uncertainty, it can be observed that rituals are part of normal 
development and that, as O’Connor (2007) notes, the child has to develop a capacity for 
‘tolerating a world beyond magic’ (p470).  If magical thinking leads to anxiety, and 
magical thinking is acknowledged to be ubiquitous, then why is clinical anxiety relatively 
rare?  Perhaps the more likely route is that anxiety prompts recourse to magical thinking 
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and that, at times of high anxiety, and perceived low personal resources to cope, recourse 
to the magical stance might become more frequent and intractable.  Future research is 
clearly needed that attempts to explicate the causal sequence, perhaps by utilising 
experimental manipulations of magical thinking and anxiety, ethical considerations 
notwithstanding.  Additionally, longitudinal studies could usefully map the progression 
from normal childhood rituals to obsessive-compulsive concerns, and the presence and 
magnitude of anxiety and magical thinking at different time-points along this progression.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study suggest that magical thinking does not differentiate 
obsessive-compulsiveness from other anxiety dimensions.  Additionally, the current 
study indicates the existence of gender differences in the relationship between magical 
thinking and anxiety that require further exploration.  Another important finding is that 
the relationship between anxiety and magical thinking held across the primary school 
age-range. An important implication of this is that developmental psychologists may need 
to go further in reconceptualising magical thinking in relation to anxieties and coping 
strategies across the life span. The prevailing view that magical thinking is merely a 
period-specific symptom of cognitive immaturity may not adequately account for the 
findings from the present study or other recent studies.  Current limitations in the 
developing body of research on magical thinking and anxiety include the reliance on 
cross-sectional designs and conceptual issues in the definition of magical thinking and its 
measurement.  Future studies should aim to focus on these issues. 
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Table 1: Pearson’s correlations between MTQ, SLOI-CV and SCAS-OC scores 
 SLOI-CV SCAS-OC 
MTQ Scale and group   
Total, All (N=94) .374*** .283** 
Total, Boys (N=44) .550*** .514*** 
Total, Girls (N=50) .294* .095 
   Thought, All (N=94) .348*** .267** 
Thought, Boys (N=44) .532*** .494*** 
Thought, Girls (N=50) .236 .085 
   Action, All (N=94) .315** .233* 
Action, Boys (N=44) .406** .382** 
Action, Girls (N=50) .333* .093 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2: Pearson correlations between MTQ and other SCAS subscale scores 
MTQ Scale and 
group 
SCAS- 
Total 
SCAS- 
Panic 
SCAS- 
Separation 
SCAS- 
Social 
SCAS- 
General 
SCAS- 
Injury 
Total, All 
(N=94) 
.323** .297** .242* .275** .270** .201 
Total, Boys 
(N=44) 
.519*** .479*** .341* .533*** .408** .274 
Total, Girls 
(N=50) 
.169 .164 .176 .103 .187 .142 
       Thought, All 
(N=94) 
.323** .261* .221* .264* .233* .235* 
Thought, Boys 
(N=44) 
.519*** .395** .340* .520*** .343* .327* 
Thought, Girls 
(N=50) 
.169 .157 .131 .080 .154 .159 
       Action, All  
(N=94) 
.287** .273** .212* .221* .255* .098 
Action, Boys 
(N=44) 
.425** .439** .238 .386* .366* .124 
Action, Girls 
(N=50) 
.194 .143 .219 .121 .205 .087 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3: Model statistics for the prediction of SLOI-CV scores in boys 
 B SE B ß 
Step 1    
Constant 1.65 1.12  
SCAS total (excl. OC) 0.28 0.04 .75* 
Step 2    
Constant 0.89 1.17  
SCAS total (excl. OC) 0.24 0.04 .64* 
MTQ total 0.21 0.11 .22 
Note: R
2
 = .56 (p<.001) for Step 1; ΔR2 = .03 (p=.07) for Step 2; *p<.001 
 
Table 4: Model statistics for the prediction of SCAS-OC scores in boys 
 B SE B ß 
Step 1    
Constant 1.86 0.88  
SCAS total (excl. OC) 0.20 0.03 .71* 
Step 2    
Constant 1.36 0.92  
SCAS total (excl. OC) 0.17 0.03 .61* 
MTQ total 0.14 0.09 .19 
Note: R
2
 = .51 (p<.001) for Step 1; ΔR2 = .03 (p=.13) for Step 2; *p<.001 
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Table 5: Pearson’s correlations between MTQ, SLOI-CV and SCAS scales by age-bands 
 5-6 year olds 
(N=33) 
7-8 year olds 
(N=27) 
9-11 year olds 
(N=34) 
MTQ Total/SLOI-CV .63** .23 .17 
MTQ Total/SCAS-OC .34 -.04 .35* 
MTQ Total/SCAS Panic .29 .44* .18 
MTQ Total/SCAS Separation .30 .06 .22 
MTQ Total/SCAS Generalised .36* .25 .34* 
MTQ Total/SCAS Total .42* .73** .35* 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
 
